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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §77-35-26(b)(1) (1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann.
§78-2a-3(c) (1953 as amended) whereby a defendant in a circuit court
criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals. In this
case, the Honorable Roger A. Livingston, Judge, Third Judicial
Circuit Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, rendered a
final judgment

and conviction against Mr. Frank Joseph Irish for

Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a class B misdemeanor, and
Making an Improper Lane Change, an infraction.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1.

Did the trial Court reversibly err in reprimanding Mr.

Irish in the presence of the jury for arriving to Court late?

2.

Was enough evidence presented by the prosecution from

which reasonable persons could have found beyond a reasonable doubt
that Mr, Irish had committed the offense of driving under the
influence of alcohol?

TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Amendment VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of counsel for his defense.
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
Sec. 12.

[Rights of accused persons].
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right
to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights
herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

TEXT OF ORDINANCES

-'-24-10')

DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRUGS AND
INTOXICANTS,

It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this
section for any person to operate or be in actual
physical control of a vehicle within this city if
the person has a blood or breath alcohol content
of .08 percent or greater by weight as shown by a
chemical test given within two hours after the
alleged operation or physical control, or if the
person under the influence of alcohol or any
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol or any
drug to a degree which renders the person
incapable of safely driving a vehicle within this
city.
12.4-1 .il») - j LANED ROADWAY DRIVING PROCEDURES
MOTORCYCLE RULES.
Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or
more clearly marked lanes for traffic, the
following rules in addition to all others
consistent herewith shall apply:
A, a vehicle shall be driven as nearly as
practicable entirely within a single lane, and
shall not be moved from such lane or across a
lane line without giving the right-of-way to
vehicles in the lane to be entered, nor until the
driver has first ascertained that such movement
can be made with safety and such driver has given
the signal prescribed in Section 12.44.140 of
this chapter, or its successor.

THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE

SALT LAKE CITY,
Plaintiff
• v.
FRANK JOSEPH IRISH,

Case No. 880536-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appeal from a judgment and conviction for Driving Under the
Influence of; "\ 1 >:oliu I , .1 •••• J.,\ y,\ \\ misdemeanor, in violation of Salt
Lake City Revised Ordinance Section 12-24-100, and Making an
Improper Lane Change, an infraction, in violation of Salt Lake City
Revised Ordinance Sectuui 1 /, --; I MJIJ,

in I UP 7'iird Judicial Circuit

Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
ROIJ*-M

«''

'
i i vi nqfst-on, Judge, presiding.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1

picked up a friend

x\

<° at- about 10: J1'

. J;..:;. "ounge,

, m. , Frank Joseph Irish
'*< » ,

Mr. Irish drove his friend to the friend's home.
a1"

f

h (i

l

i" 1^1,1*

h »m<-\, " , l,,ri,,!, had one beer

had not consumed any alcohol prior b

From the lounge,
(Tr. 9 5 ) .

'**•.

j

•. . .
j

While
_r. Irish

.

About a half in ho-;:; after Mr. Irish had the one beer, Mr.
Irish dii'i liL/i 1." f i»-

;

M i n g westbound on North Temple.

(Tr. 97). Mr. Irish stopped his vehicle to wait for a green light
at the intersection at 800 West and North Temple.

(Tr. 98) While at

this intersection Mr. Irish and his friend engaged in a heated
argument causing Mr. Irish to not see the light turn green until
about three quarters of the way through the green light cycle.
98,50,51).

(Tr.

Officer Mickey Paul testified that as Mr. Irish moved

through the intersection he moved towards the right lane.

(Tr. 51)

There was a heavy flow of traffic that evening.

Officers

(Tr. 97)

Paul and Kirk activated their red and blue flashing lights and
sirens.

(Tr. 53)
Mr. Irish saw this and slowly moved to the right lane to

make way for the officers.

(Tr. 53,97) There is a dispute in the

evidence as the officers testified Mr. Irish did not use his signal
when changing lanes as Mr. Irish testified he did use his signal.
(Tr. 51-53, 97,98).
Officer Paul spoke with Mr. Irish and noticed a odor of
alcohol coming from the car.

(Tr. 55)

Officer Paul noticed there

was also a passenger in the car (Tr. 72)

The passenger was drunk

and there was an odor of alcohol about him.

(Tr. 99)

Officer Paul questioned Mr. Irish and asked him to submit
himself to a field sobriety test.

(Tr. 58). Throughout the field

sobriety test, Mr. Irish was very belligerent and constantly made
fun of the tests.

(Tr. 63-68)

Mr. Irish was placed under arrest by Officer Paul and
requested to submit to a chemical test, the intoxylizer.

(Tr. 68).

Mr. Irish refused to submit to the test because he was concerned

about the nte":1ization OL f-"
Throughout

t;v> •::/. :re M m p ,

-.-^^ .' T-:

( -

•

•• -

35,36).

....

. ,j - ent.

(Tr.

85,86).
A

OULL.

"*

took a recess at noon .

when

the trial resumed again, the jury was seated in the : - *. •
defense counsel and **ir

' rish were not preset

H o n o r a b ] e R o g e i:

-

late and informed them that f v

*

:y

--.,46).

. r / fur.

:ri^: A .

at
The

starting

••-oceid "without any

interruption whatsoever, ?xce^ -"or l-h- fa :t t ^ a t- our defendant and
defense i

<, r

•

-?

"

following exchange too*, place ; •; t.he jury's presence.

Ti:

This afternoon took a little longer than what we
anticipated, bi i1 a11 that is ironed out and we'11
be able to proceed with the trial now without any
interruption whatsoever, except for the fact that
our defendant and defense counsel will be coming
in just momentarily.

PROSECUTION: The record should reflect that at present
time defendant and no counsel are present.
JUDGE:

I'm sorry.

PROSECUTION: The record should reflect that at the
present time neither defendant nor counsel are
present
JUDGE:

That's correct, defense counsel was instructed to
return with the defendant.

PROSECUTION:
CONVERSAT.;
JUDGE:

The

This is taken

from pages 46 througu 4d of the trial transcript.
, JUDGE:

16 )

iMay I approach a moment?
\1 THE BENCH

It is now 10 minutes after 2:00 and we're ready
to begin again trial in this matter of Salt Lake
City v. Frank Irish. The City is prepared to

proceed and have your first witness present, is
that correct?
PROSECUTION:
JUDGE:

Yes.

The record should further reflect that Mr. Loyd,
counsel for the defendant, is present. The
defendant has absented himself from the
courtroom, the court has allowed defense counsel
some time in an effort to locate his client, we
will proceed in this point in absentia proceeding
until he, in fact, does appear. I've also
instructed the security from the court - - - - Mr. Irish, I want you to come up here and sit at
this table and I am instructing you by order of
this court that you are not to leave this
courtroom unless and until you are so authorized
by this court. Why don't you sit over there next
to your counsel. Do you understand what I'm
saying to you.?

MR. IRISH:

Yes, sir.

Further on in the trial, the Court takes one more recess
before the jury retires to reach a verdict.

(Tr. 107). Again in

the jury's presence, Judge Livingston states, "And Mr. Loyd , will
you stay with your client?"

(Tr. 107).

The jury subsequently returns with a verdict of guilty of
all three counts.

(Tr. 118).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Mr. Frank Joseph Irish's rights to a fair and impartial
trial were violated when the trial judge reprimanded him in the
jury's presence.

The error was prejudicial to Mr. Irish.

The City failed to present a sufficient quantity of
evidence to support a conviction for Driving Under the Influence
of Alcohol.

- 4-

ARGUMENT

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
REPRIMANDING APPELLANT IN THE JURY'S PRESENCE
WHEN HE ARRIVED AFTER THE TRIAL COMMENCED.
Both the United States and Utah roisf. i--utions
- , :- ,
impartial and fai r jury of his peers.

•

provide that

: •. • t :) 1 : e t r i ed b] - an

This right to a fair trial i

jealously protected and is essential to the proper functioning of
our system, of criminal justice.
The judge plays a critical role in this endeavor to ensure
en-

• , -p 5 - r e i v e s a fair trial.

^•i. I*"?

State v. Pokini, 526 P. 2d 94

Therefore, it is essential that the trial judge not

only r.e rota 1 ./ indifferent as between the parties, but must also
^;r- - -

i )£ I : =i:i I i• :j ; 3o . Kinna _v. St.ate , 4 47 P . 2( 3 32 (1: Jev .

1968).
To project this appearance of impartiality, the judge must
b e e x t i: e m e 1 y c a r e f i I 1 a, 3 t : :) 'v 11 1 a t 1 1 < * s a y s < :> r d o e s b e c a u s e t h e j i 11:;; r
looks to the judge as their guide and guardian.

Ij3. at 35.

The

influence the trial judge has on the jury is great and the lightest
w o r d :> r :i 1 11 i m i d a t i o n i 3 received
prove controlling.

the j u 1: y w i 11 1 d eference a 1 1 d may

Querela v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 470

(1963).
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct adopted on March 1,
1974, by all the courts of justice in Utah provides in part:
A judge should be patient, dignified and
courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses,
lawyers, and others who come before the court . .
Canon 1 of the same Code also provides that a judge "should
exhibit conduct which promotes public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary".
The judge plays a critical role in the judicial process.
When the judge's conduct, regardless of whether such conduct was
intentional or not, brings to question the fairness of an
individual's trial, the court must give the accused the benefit of
the doubt and order a new trial.
The United States Supreme Court has set a standard by which
it can determine if the error is harmful so as to warrant a new
trial.

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 87 (1967); Fahy v.

Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963).

Pursuant to this standard,

the error is harmful "if there is a reasonable possibility that the
matter complained of might have contributed to the conviction."
State v. Pokini, 526 P.2d at 101, quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375
U.S. at 86-87.

That is, the error must be harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt otherwise the error merits a reversal.

Chapman v.

California, 386 U.S. at 24.
In this case, the City had 3 witnesses.
witnesses were police officers.
the defendant.

All three

The defense had only one witness,

The testimony given by the officers, for the most

p a i: t , , 31 1 a r j: • 1 y c o rtf ] i c t e 3 w 11 h 11 i e t e s t :i in o i v • < :) f 11 I e d e f e n d a n t

The

defense's case depended for t ;ve .nosl c:.-^: M the credibility of the
defendant.

This was a typical case -^f who the u r y b^liev-i and

w h e n I nf.j judy>- i »*huk"'i I

.

defense, this is prejudicial e ^ o r
In

>e

-an-: *ej aires a reversal.

S t a t e v . P o k . n i , '1 ,> ? . ^ i ^ :

rebuked defense counsel severa. *im-= *

- "* i x *• n ^ t : ~; j u d g e

' s.
*: ,

- *..

The cour I:

stated:
A case of gui11 is never strong if evidence
essential to conviction is the testimony of an
alleged accomplice whose credibility the
defendant subjects to severe attach. i^d. at 102.
vh-j •• - the defense's case depends for the

In c h e " vor:*
-

.

.,

,

-

^ -

<

•

>

•.-

*

-

i.-

•

•

*

- ^

a key witness, any remarks by the judge that may have diminished
counsel's efficacy in the eyes of the jury is prejudicial error :d.
at

Certainly, if remarks fay the trial judge to defense counsel
1,1

S f U e v. P o k i n i is pre judicial error then remarks to the

defendant; as in this case must also be prejudicial error.
all,

Aft .er

the principal person whose credibility is at question in any

trial is the defendant.

It is difficult enough to keep the jury

focused on the concept of presumption of innocence without the judge
making remarks that portray the defendant as an irresponsible,
i :ii: 11 i:i ist wort h] • :i t i« 3:ii ; idi ia.1 w 1 io mi lst 1 ::>e r e p e a t e d 1 y o r d e r e d •: .- r e m a i n
the courtroom with his attorney every time the Court takes a

- 7 -

recess.

(Tr. 107). As the Court in State v. PokinL stated, the

trial judges short-tempered remarks in the presence of the jury,
exacerbated by repetition, "cling to the mind like a tattoo on the
epidermis."

I_d. at 104, quoting Carlile v. State, L76 So. 862, 864

(1937).
It seems in this case, that the Judge had a number of
alternatives available to him.

The Judge could have waited for a

moment when the jury was not in the courtroom to inquire of Mr.
Irish why he was late and reprimand him for being late.

The Judge

may have also kept the jury out until he was ready to commence the
trial without the defendant's presence and limit his remarks to the
fact that the defendant was not present and admonish the jury that
this should not affect their decision as to the defendant's guilt or
innocence.
Instead, the Judge permitted the jury to sit in the court
room while defense counsel attempted to locate the defendant and
then instructed the jury that the delay was because the defendant
was not present and the Court would proceed anyway.

Furthermore,

the judge states in the jury's presence that he has instructed the
Court security to do something about the matter.(Tr. 48). Part way
through this instruction, the defendant enters the Court room and
the judge in a stern tone orders the defendant not to leave the
Court room without permission.

All this takes place in the jury's

presence.
This conduct by the judge is prejudicial error as he should
have excused the jury before reprimanding the defendant.
State, 441 P.2d 476 (Okl 1968)
- 8 -

Dale v.

POINT TT

INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTED TO SUPPORT THE
CONVICTION OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF
ALCOHOL AGAINST MR. IRISH,
The standard employed for reviewing the sufficiency of
evidence and nAv»-M" n. mi

i jimi

-

^ ir.; -• - - ^

"-'at e

v, Petree, 659 P.2d 44 j, 444 (Utah 198:/, :he "ran Supreme Cou't
stated, "[Njo* withstanding ' :i- presumptior

^vor

decision thi

•• *

-

r *

the evidence to support the verdict *

-'ur-'ie"

)f the jury's
. • • *:-*. *

:e Court noted:

We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient
evidence only when the evidence is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime for which he was convicted. Ij3. at 444.
T h e Z :> i 11: t I: i a, 3 a < 3 o p t e < 3 i 1 i e v e r i s - a rn « 3 s t a n d a r d for reviewing
cases for sufficiency of evidence.
1030 (Utah App. 1987).
•.

.. .

-^

State v. Garcia, 744 p.2d 1029,

This standard restates the due process
*

case except

'^ r

upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which the defendant is charged.
\ « Virginia/
(1970).

M

1

n

ii'i 1 -!^

L n i •> U n s h i p ,

Jackson

3'+ ' i.S. 353

The City necessarily must have proven beyond a reasonable
doubt each element of Salt Lake City Revised Ordinances Section.
That ordinance reads:

12.24.100

DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRUGS AND
INTOXICANTS

A. 1. It is unlawful and punishable as provided
in this section for any person to operate or be
in physical control of a vehicle within this city
if the person has a blood or breath alcohol
content of .08 percent or greater byweight as
shown by a chemical test given within two hours
after the alleged operation or physical control,
or if the person under the influence of alcohol
or any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol
or any drug to a degree which renders the person
incapable of safely driving a vehicle within this
city.
Mr. Irish urges that the evidence introduced to support the
allegation that he was under the influence of alcohol or drug
rendering him incapable of safely driving a vehicle was insufficient
and that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt
as to the efficacy of that particular element.
The evidence introduced by the City to support this element
consisted of testimony by a police officer who stated that Mr. Irish
was weaving, driving too slow, did not stop as soon as he should
have, had an odor of alcohol about him, failed the field sobriety
tests and was extremely belligerent.
The defense provided a reasonable explanation to each of
these allegation.

First, Mr. Irish stated that he was engrossed in

a heated argument with the passenger thereby causing him not to see
the light turn green and driving slow.
Secondly, Mr. Irish testified, and the officer's testimony
verified, that there was a passenger in the vehicle who was close to
"passed out" drunk.

The odor of alcohol was therefore quite

prevalent.
Thirdly, Mr. Irish, and the officer's testimony verified
that Mr. Irish was extremely belligerent and uncooperative during
the field sobriety tests.

For example, during the handslap test,

Mr. Irish refused to follow the officer's instructions and instead
recited "pat-a-cake, pat-a-cake".
Mr. Irish's conduct can be interpreted as conduct by one
who is intoxicated.

However, it is more the conduct of one who

dislikes the authority of police officers and refuses to submit to
any display of such authority.

This causes reasonable doubt as to

whether Mr. Irish was intoxicated or simply a very unpleasant person.
Accordingly, the requisite element of intoxication is
suspect, and reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt that Mr. Irish committed the crime of driving under the
influence of alcohol.

This Court should so find and vacate the

conviction entered against Mr. Irish.

-

11

CONCLUSION

For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the appellant, Mr.
Frank Joseph Irish, requests this Court reverse his convictions for
driving under the influence of alcohol and making an improper lane
change and remand this case with an order for either a new trial or
a dismissal of the charge.

Respectfully submitted this

IF*

«

day of May, 1989.

yu~J
Vernice S. Ah Ching J
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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